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I. Introduction

F

or many centuries the annistice agreement has been the method most
frequently employed to bring about a cessation of hostilities in international
conflict, particularly where the opposing belligerents have reached what might
be termed a stalemate. This practice has not only continued but has probably
increased, during the present century.
The first World War ended in an extended series of so-called annistice
agreements.! During the twenty-one years which elapsed before the outbreak
of the second World War there were really only two such agreements of any
historical importance: that entered into in Shanghai on May 5, 1932, which
brought about a cessation of hostilities in the Sino-Japanese conflict of that
period? and that entered into at Buenos Aires onJune 12, 1935, which ended
3
hostilities between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Gran Chaco.
The second World War also ended in an extended series ofso-called annistice
agreements; 4 and in the comparatively short period of time since then, there
have already been no less than ten major general annistice agreements concluded
by belligerents. 5 This increased importance in modem practice of the general
annistice as an instrument leading to the restoration of peace has resulted in it
having been likened to the preliminaries of peace6 (which it has, in fact,
practically superseded), and even to a definitive treaty of peace? Under the
circumstances, it appears appropriate to review the history and development of
the general armistice as a major international convention concerned with the
non-hostile relations of belligerents, as well as to detennine its present status
8
under international law.

II. General Discussion
What is the nature of a general annistice agreement, the war convention
which has properly been termed "the most important and most frequently
reached agreement between belligerents,,?9 A general annistice is an agreement
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between belligerents which results in a complete cessation of all hostilities for a
specified period of time, usually of some considerable duration, or for an
indeterminate period. It applies to all of the forces of the opposing belligerents,
wherever they may be located. It may have a political and economic, as well as
a mili·tary, ch aracter. 10
This definition, while adequate to describe the nature of a general armistice,
necessarily omits many peripheral but nevertheless important facets of the term
defined, facets which it is essential should be borne in mind in any searching
analysis of the problem. What is the legal basis of the general armistice? How
does it come into being? Does it create a new juridical status between the
belligerents? These are but a few of the more important of the many questions
relating to this problem.
As has already been noted, the armistice is a war convention. By definition a
convention is an agreement; it is a contract; it is consensual. That this is all true
of an armistice is fully established by reference to numerous international
.
11 mili·tary manu als, 12 an d auth ors 0 f texts 0 f·mternatlon
. allaw. 13
conventtons,
Belligerents are free to enter into an armistice or to decline to do so. They are
free to include in an armistice any provisions which they may desire, unfettered
by either legal restrictions or precedents, guided only by the necessities ofwar. 14
As one author has apdy stated:
The contractual field for an annistice is completely open. Here again" contracts
take the place oflaw as between those who enter into them.,,15
It follows that there is no fixed rule or custom which prescribes what provisions
16
should or should not be included in an armistice agreement. On the other
hand, there are certain provisions which, as will be seen, are very generally
included by the parties, not because of any legal compulsion, but rather because
experience has proven that such provisions are ofa nature to facilitate the purpose
of the armistice and to insure against violations thereo£ 17 And whether the
parties specifically provide therefor or not, an armistice does result in a complete
1S
cessation of active hostilities; that is, it results in a cease_fire. Without a
cease-fire there would, by definition, be no armistice.
Being a contract, it must be negotiated. Because a general armistice results in
a cessation of all hostilities, and because it may contain political and economic
as well as military provisions, it has political significance. It may, therefore, be
19
made only on behalf of the sovereignty of the state. This sovereignty may be
expressed by either of two methods: first, the armistice may contain a specific
provision that it is to become effective only after ratification?O or second, the
representatives of the state designated to negotiate the armistice, and they may
be military or civilian or both, may be provided with full powers?l Modern
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practice appears to prefer the latter method. There were no ratifications of the
so-called Armistice Agreements reached during either World War I or World
War rr.22 All of the armistice agreements reached under the aegis of the United
Nations have been negotiated by representatives with full powers. None has
. d ratl·ficatlon.
. 23
reqUIre
While it cannot be disputed that a state has complete freedom in determining
who will represent it in negotiating an armistice, there have been conflicting
expressions of opinion as to the advisability of the selection of military personnel
for this purpose. Gentili did not believe that the task of negotiating an armistice
should be delegated to the military. He said: "Therefore the leaders in war should
handle matters which belong to war and not other matters.,,24 On the other
hand, one modem writer states that "it is clear that, once the decision is made,
the actual negotiations should be conducted by the military organs.,,25
It cannot be said that there is any established modem practice in this regard.
The Renville Truce Agreement (Netherlands-Indonesia) and the India-Pakistan
Cease-fire Order and Truce Agreement were both negotiated by diplomatic
representatives. The four Israeli-Arab Armistice Agreements were negotiated by
the military on behalf of each of the Arab countries and by mixed
civilian-military delegations on behalf of Israel. The Korean Armistice
Agreement was negotiated and signed exclusively by the military on both sides.
And the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina were
negotiated by both military and diplomatic representatives. 26 As a matter offact,
with modem methods of communication, the question is no longer ofvery great
importance inasmuch as the decision of the negotiator, whether he be military
or civilian, will actually be made in each instance pursuant to instructions
received direcdy from his home capital?7 Perhaps the best solution would be a
"mixed team" consisting of members drawn both from the military and from
the diplomatic corps, the practice followed by Israel in its negotiations with the
Arab states, and by both sides in the Indo-Chinese negotiations.
A matter ofmajor legal interest is that of the juridical status which exists during
the period while an armistice is in effect. Is it war, or peace, or some third status?
While there has, on occasion, been some rather loose language used with regard
to this question, it may be stated as a positive rule that an armistice does not
terminate the state of war existing between the belligerents, either de jure or de
facto, and that the state of war continues to exist and to control the actions of
28
neutrals as well as belligerents.
As long ago as the days when Greece and Rome were at the zenith of their
power, it became accepted law that, although the indutiae (armistice or truce)
resulted in a cessation of hostilities, it did not, as did the Joedus (treaty of peace),
result in a termination of the war. 29 The early writers on international law
3D
concurred in this conclusion. The great majority of contemporary writers
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likewise do so?1 Both the American and the British military manuals have
unifonnly taken the position that an armistice is merely a cessation of active
32
hostilities and is not to be described as either a temporary or a partial peace.
The rule stated above has received affirmative judicial approval on a number
of occasions. Thus, the United States Supreme Court, confronted with the
question of whether the 1918 Armistice had brought about a state of peace,
ruled that "complete peace, in a legal sense, had not come to pass by the effect
of the Armistice and the cessation of hostilities. ,,33 Similarly, on November 3,
1944, the French Court of Cassation stated that "an armistice convention
concluded between two belligerents constitutes only a provisional suspension
of hostilities, and cannot itself put an end to the state of war. "34
A few years ago an incident occurred in the Security Council of the United
Nations which has been misconstrued as indicating a rule contrary to that
discussed immediately above. Subsequent to the execution of the
Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement, Egypt continued to maintain its
"blockade" of the Suez Canal insofar as Israel was concerned. Israel complained
to the Security Council asserting that the four armistice agreements had, in effect,
terminated the state of war between all of the belligerent parties. Egypt, on the
other hand, contended that the state of war continued despite the armistice
agreements and that the blockade was legal. The Security Council on
35
September 1, 1951, passed a resolution calling upon Egypt to lift its blockage.
This action of the Security Council has been construed as indicating that a
general armistice is a kind of de facto termination of war. 36 It is considered more
likely that the Security Council's action was based upon a desire to bring to an
end a situation fraught with potential danger to peace than that it was attempting
to change a long established rule of international law. By now it has surely
become fairly obvious that the Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements did
37
not create even a de facto termination of the war between those states.
One of the most frequent problems to arise with regard to the interpretation
of a general armistice has been the determination of those acts which are
permitted and those which are prohibited. There have been two very definite
schools of thought on this problem. One school, long designated as the one with
the weight of authority behind it, takes the position that during a general
armistice a belligerent cannot legally do anything which the enemy would have
38
wanted to and could have prevented him from doing but for the armistice.
The other school, long designated as the one with the weight of reasoning as
well as the weight of practice behind it, takes the position that during a general
armistice the belligerents must refrain from doing only those acts which are
expressly prohibited by it.39 This di~ute is apparendy as old as history,40 and is
now of historical significance only. 1 Modem discussions of the subject point
out the problem of enforcement and the invitation to charge and countercharge
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inherent in what might be tenned the classical approach. In recent years the
belligerents have been prone to spell out with particularity all those specific acts
which are to be renounced during a general armistice. 43 Whether or not this is
more conducive to an atmosphere which will lead to a restoration of peace is
probably debatable, with strong arguments to be made on either side.
Nevertheless, the modem rule appears to be that belligerents may be presumed
to have the right to do anything which is not specifically forbidden by the tenns
of the armistice agreement; and, conversely, that the doing of an act not
specifically prohibited, even though the other side could have prevented it but
for the agreement on the cessation of hostilities, cannot validly be made the basis
for a complaint of violation or for the denunciation of the armistice.

III. Provisions of Armistice Agreements
Mention has already been made of the fact that the modem general armistice
may, and frequently does, contain military, political, and economic provisions. 44
An analysis ofthe various provisions ofa number ofgeneral armistice agreements,
using as models not only the post-World War II agreements of this category,
but also a number of older ones, will disclose the direction which the armistice
is taking in the dynamics of international law, and will permit the drawing of
. conclUSlons.
'
45
certam
Incorporated within the hundreds of armistice agreements which have been
concluded over the course of centuries it is possible to discover provisions
covering almost every conceivable topic. Many such provisions are probably no
longer relevant under conditions of modem warfare; and many were apt only
because of the situation pertaining to a particular conflict. With the foregoing,
which are interesting for historical reasons but which have no particular present
legal significance, it is not necessary to concern onesel£ The present-day student
of this problem will be concerned exclusively with the provisions which
belligerents have, either consistently over the centuries, or atleast in recent times,
believed it appropriate to incorporate in armistice agreements concluded by
them.
In general, what matters should one expect to find included in a typical
armistice agreement? Probably the most thorough and up-to-date answer to that
question is contained in The LAw ofLAnd Warfare, the new Manual of the United
States Anny.46 Summarized, the provisions suggested therein relate to:
(1) Effective date and time;
(2) Duration;

(3) Line of demarcation and neutral zone;
(4) Relations with inhabitants;
(5) Prohibited acts;
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(6) Prisoners of war;
(7) Consultative machinery;
(8) Miscellaneous politico-military matters.

Any discussion of the contents of an annistice agreement must logically begin
with a discussion of the suspension of hostilities. That subject disposed of, one
may tum to those of the above-enumerated items which are of some particular
current interest.

A. Suspension of Hostilities
As has already been remarked, an annisticel,er se, with or without a specific
provision, results in a cessation ofhostilities. 4 Nevertheless, only on very rare
occasions have the parties failed to include such a provision.
The Truce ofRatisbonne, signed on August 15, 1684, on behalf of Leopold,
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, and Louis XIV, King of France, did not
specifically suspend hostilities. It contained a provision establishing a truce for
twenty years from the date of ratification. 48 For whatever significance it may
have, it should be noted that we find the same parties entering into the Truce
ofVigevano on October 7, 1696, only twelve years later, and this time with a
specific provision for a suspension of hostilities. 49
In April, 1814, Napoleon abdicated as Emperor and an annistice was entered
into between the Allies and the French. While the brother of Louis XVIII had
come to France as the representative ofthe King, there was considerable question
as to the extent of control which he would be able to exercise over Napoleon's
Grand Army. Accordingly, the annistice provided for a suspension of hostilities
but only if "the commanding officers of the French annies and fortified places
shall have signified to the allied troops opposed to them that they have recognized
the authority of the Lieutenant General of the Kingdom ofFrance.,,50 Although
a somewhat similarly confused political situation existed in Italy in 1943, it was
apparendy considered unnecessary to include such a provision in the Annistice
Agreement of September 3, 1943, between the United Nations forces and the
government of Marshal Badoglio which had succeeded Mussolini. 51
The Annistice Protocol signed by the Russians and the Japanese at
Portsmouth on September 1, 1905, contained a clause prohibiting
bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces, but no other provision with
regard to the suspension ofhostilities. 52 It directed the two governments to order
their military commanders to put the Protocol into effect. On September 13 an
agreement was reached by the army commanders in Manchuria which
53
specifically provided for the suspension of hostilities effective on September 16.
On September 18, a "Naval Protocol of Annistice" was signed by the navy
commanders which, while it established a boundary line between the two fleets,
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again did not specifically suspend hostilities. 54 And the two anny commanders
in Korea were unable to reach an agreement prior to the exchange of ratifications
of the peace treaty on September 25. 55
On a number of occasions the United Nations has adopted, apparently
without any reason therefor, terminology new to international law in its actions
relating to armistice agreements. The Renville Truce Agreement uses the novel
tenn "stand-fast and cease-fire.,,56 The India-Pakistan Agreement provides for
a "cease_fire.,,57 The Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements adopt the
procedure ofomitting a specific provision for a suspension ofhostilities-perhaps
on the theory that this was unnecessary in view of the "truce" which had
previously been imposed on the belligerents by the United Nations-and merely
established "a general armistice between the anned forces of the two Parties.,,58
The Korean Armistice Agreement reverted to standard procedure, providing
for "a complete cessation of all hostilities" in Korea. 59

B. Effective Date and Time
It has been stated that
in armistices time is of the first consideration. The time of conunencement and
the moment of termination should be fixed beyond all possibility of
.
.
60
nusconcepoon.
In the event that the armistice fails to specify an effective date and time, it is
61
assumed that it is intended to become effective immediately upon signing.
Because of difficulties in assuring the receipt of proper notification by all
commands, or for other reasons, it has, on occasion, been deemed advisable to
62
have the armistice become effective on a later date. For the same reason, the
suspension of hostilities has on occasion been made effective at different times
in different areas. 63 In view of the nature of the elaborate communications
systems with which the modem anny is usually equipped, neither of these
situations should any longer occur.
The United States has been involved in at least one controversy with regard
to the effective date of an armistice. The Protocol of Washington (United
States-Spain), which was signed on August 12, 1898, provided that
upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two
countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as
possible by each Government to the commanders of the military and naval
forces. 64
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The effective date of the suspension of hostilities was obviously not stated with
sufficient precision. Spain later contended that the protocol had been effective
from the date of signature. The United States took the position that this would
render meaningless the latter part of the provision and that the suspension of
hostilities had become effective only upon receipt of notification by the military
and naval commanders in the field. More care in the drafting of the provision
would have obviated this dispute, which involved the capitulation of Manila.
The importance ofclearly indicating the effective date and time ofan armistice
agreement appears to be a lesson well learned, for we find that the subject is fully
65
covered in all of the post-World War II armistice agreements. Continued
adherence to this practice will be at least a small step in minimizing the difficulties
between belligerents which inevitably arise during any armistice.

c. Duration
Two types of provision with regard to duration are found in armistice
agreements. Some specify a definite period. Thus, the Armistice ofNikolsburg
and that of Shimonoseki provided for durations of four weeks and twenty-one
days, respectively.66 The Armistice ofMalmoe, concluded by the King ofPrussia
and the King of Denmark on August 26, 1848, provided for an armistice of
seven months with automatic prolongation unless one month's advance notice
was given by either party.67 And the agreement reached by the French and the
Austrians in Vienna on July 13, 1809, provided for an armistice of one month,
but with fifteen days advance notice of resumption of hostilities. 68 Others
provide for an indefinite duration or contain no provision whatsoever on this
subject. Where this is the situation, the armistice remains effective until due
notice of denunciation has been given by one of the belligerent parties.
It has been said that "it is customary to sti~ulate with exactness the period of
time during which hostilities are suspended." 9 Although, prior to the twentieth
century, armistice agreements, more frequendy than not, specified an exact
duration, modem practice seems to be otherwise. No duration is specified in
any of the major armistice agreements concluded since World War II. Thus, for
example, the Renville Truce Agreement provides that it shall be considered
binding unless, in effect, one party terminates it because of violations by the
other party?O The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement provides that
it "shall remain in effect until a peaceful setdement between the Parties is
achieved.,,71 The Korean Armistice Agreement provides that it shall remain in
effect until superseded by "an appropriate agreement for a peaceful setdement
at a political level between both sides."n Of course it may be argued that these
two latter agreements are determinate, inasmuch as they remain in effect until
an event certain. Perhaps so, but it can scarcely be said that there has been any
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stipulation with exactness as to the duration of the annistice under these
circumstances. The Israeli-Lebanese General Annistice Agreement is seven years
old and no "peaceful setdement" is in sight. And while the Korean Annistice
Agreement is only three years old, the "peaceful setdement" mentioned therein
looks equally remote.
It has been stated above that where an annistice is ofindetenninate duration,
it remains effective until "due notice" of denunciation has been given.
Sometimes an annistice specifies the period of advance notice of denunciation
which is required. Thus, the second Thessaly Annistice entered into by the
Greeks and the Turks on June 3, 1897, provided for 24 hours' notice of
resumption ofhostilities?3 More often, it does not. Article 47 of the Declaration
of Brussels admonished that "proper warning be given to the enemy, in
accordance with the conditions of the annistice,,?4 and Article 36 of both of
the Hague Regulations (1899 and 1907) said approximately the same thing?5
The practical value of these provisions is dubious?6 It is precisely when there
is no relevant condition in the annistice agreement that resort must be had to
general international law. In this instance, conventional international law being
lacking, resort must be had to custom-and custom says that ''fOOd faith requires
that notice be given of the intention to resume hostilities.,,7
A number of authors have commented on Sherman's ire when the armistice
which he had concluded with Johnston on April 18, 1865, was disapproved by
President Johnson and Secretary Stanton, and upon his honor and fairness in
giving 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities to General J ohnston?8 Of
79
his ire there can be no doubt. Without attempting to detract from General
Sherman's honor and sense of fairness, it is necessary to point out that the
annistice itself provided for 48 hours' notice of resumption of hostilities. 80
Actually, Sherman even referred to this provision of the annistice agreement in
., th e notlce
. w h'IC h'It reqUlre
. d .81
gIvmg

D. Demarcation Line and Neutral Zone
A demarcation line between the two belligerent forces, frequendy
accompanied by a neutral zone, has long been a technique employed for the
purpose of preventing incidents which, even though inadvertent, might lead to
a resumption of hostilities. 82 The statement that a "neutral zone is actually the
only means there is of preventing violations of the annistice,,83 is probably too
strong and tends to overevaluate the neutral zone. A neutral zone is
unquestionably a very great aid in preventing incidents. However, it is definitely
not a cure-all.
The last century provides a number of historical examples of the use of the
demarcation line and the neutral zone in armistice agreements. In the Annistice
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of Cintra (France-Allies) provision was made for the River Siandre to be the
line of demarcation between the two armies with Torres Vidras as "no man's
land.,,84 The French-Austrian Armistice of Vienna of 1809 plotted a line of
demarcation from point to point, but did not provide for a neutral zone. 85 The
Armistice ofNikolsburg required the Austrians to remain 2~ miles from a line
of demarcation which had been previously established, thus creating a neutral
zone entirely at the expense of the Austrians. 86 And in the Greco-Turkish War
of 1897 both the Armistice ofEpirus and that ofThessaly provided for lines of
. 87
demarcatIon.
The post-World War II armistice agreements have, in the main, followed the
long established tradition. The Renville Truce Agreement provided for both a
line of demarcation and a demilitarized zone. Like so many other novelties in
this document, the line of demarcation was designated "the status quo line"-a
term unique to this agreement!88 The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice
Agreement created a demarcation line and provided that only defensive forces
89
would be permitted "in the region" of the line.
This rather unusual
arrangement was probably due to the fact that the demarcation line was the
international boundary line between Lebanon and Palestine.
The Korean Armistice Agreement contains a rather elaborate series of
provisions establishing and regulating both a "Military Demarcation Line" and
a "Demilitarized Zone.,,90 The same may be said of the agreements entered into
at Geneva on July 20, 1954, between representatives of the
Commanders-in-Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina and of the
People's Army ofViet-Nam. 91
It will be noted that the foregoing enumeration does not include the
India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement. In that
agreement it was not necessary to create a demarcation line or a neutral zone,
inasmuch as Pakistan agreed to withdraw her forces from the territory of the
State ofJammu and Kashmir.92

E. Relations with Inhabitants
A number of different problems arise during an armistice with regard to the
relations between the belligerents and the local inhabitants. These problems
include the movement of civilians from the territory controlled by one
belligerent to that controlled by the other, commercial intercourse between the
two territories, etc. However, as will be seen, these problems are all interrelated.
Article 50 of the Declaration of Brussels merely stated that it was within the
power of the two belligerents "to define in the clauses of the armistice the
relations which shall exist between the populations.,,93 Article 39 of both of the
Hague Regulations purported to extend the contractual freedom of the parties
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by specifically including therein "what communications may be held in the
theatre ofwar with the inhabitants and between the inhabitants ofone belligerent
State and those of the other.,,94 Neither of the foregoing provisions included
Lieber's corollary to the effect that "if nothing is stipulated the intercourse
remains suspended, as during actual hostilities.,,95 Both the Rules of Land
Warfare and The Law ofLand Warfare elaborate somewhat on Lieber, pointing
out the necessity for a specific provision in the armistice, and then stating:
Otherwise these relations remain unchanged, each belligerent continuing to
exercise the same rights as before, including the right to prevent or control all
intercourse between the inhabitants within his lines and persons within the enemy
lines. 96
It is probably also appropriate to point out here that Article 134 of the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, directs the belligerents, upon the close of hostilities, "to ensure the return
ofall internees to their last place ofresidence, or to facilitate their repatriation. ,,97
From the foregoing it is clear that the official point of view is that the parties
may include provisions concerning civilians in the armistice agreement, but that,
failing such provisions, the condition of civilians remains unchanged from that
existing during hostilities. The writers of texts on the subject are not quite so
unanimous. The majority concur with the doctrines set forth above. 98 At least
one author believes that "liberty of movement [for the civilian population] is
presumed if the armistice is general and is concluded for a sufficiendy long period
of time.,,99 No justification has been found for that statement. Another states
that it may be desirable to provide in the armistice for the relaxation of the
prohibitions imposed on civilians-but he does not even hint that there is any
. In
. tea
h bsence 0 fspec!
· f i c provlSlon.
.. 100
presumpllon
What has been the actual practice in this regard? Probably the most unusual
suggestion was that made to the Estates General in 1608 by the French and
British Ambassadors when they were attempting to use their good offices to
terminate the hostilities in which the United Provinces were then engaged with
Spain. They proposed armistice provisions which would not only have permitted
commerce and communications between the territories controlled by the two
belligerents, but also included what could only be characterized as a
most-favored-nation clause!101 This proposal, perhaps understandably, was not
included in the Truce of Antwerp, which was eventually reached by the parties
102
in 1609.
The Armistice ofUlm, which was concluded on March 14, 1647, between
Louis XIV and his allies on one side and the Elector Maximilian and his allies
on the other side, authorized a complete resumption of commerce between the
citizens of the two sides except for certain specified items such as saltpeter,
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103
powder, arms, etc.
The Truce of Ratisbonne also reestablished commerce
104
between the two belligerents.
Then, two and a half-centuries later, we find
a somewhat similar provision in the Renville Truce Agreement, where Article 6
specifies that "trade and intercourse between all areas should be permitted as far
as possible.,,10S
While the Korean Armistice Agreement contains no provision with regard
to commercial intercourse, it does contain elaborate provisions for the
movement of civilians who were in territory controlled by one belligerent and
who were normally resident in territory controlled by the other. 106 The
Vietnamese Agreement went even a step further, permitting any civilian to cross
over to the territory controlled by the other belligerent ifhe desired to go there
to live, the only restriction being that the move had to be made during the
107
period allocated for troop withdrawals.
The latter Agreement also provides
for the "liberation and repatriation" ofall civilian internees held by either side. 108
This bears some resemblance to the provision of the Geneva Civilian
Convention to which reference has already been made. 109

F. Prisoners of War
The problem of prisoners of war has received extremely varied treatment in
armistice agreements over the centuries and still remains one which can be most
difficult of solution.
The Armistice ofUlm provided for the release of all prisoners of war by both
sides without the payment of ransom, this last proviso probably having been the
most important feature of that agreement as far as the belligerents themselves
were concerned. 110 Surprisingly enough, we find that the parties still considered
it essential to specify a waiver of ransom in the armistice agreement concluded
in 1814 after Napoleon's first downfall. However, the importance of the latter
armistice from our point of view is twofold: It provided that all prisoners of war
should be "immediately sent back to their respective countries"; and it provided
for the appointment of commissioners by each side "in order to carry this general
liberation into eff"ect."l11 In the Armistice of Malmoe it was agreed that all
prisoners of war would be "set free"; and a supplementary agreement stated
where they would be taken for "delivery to their officers.,,112
Article 20 of both of the Hague Regulations provided for the repatriation of
.
r.
" th
IUSlOn
'
pnsoners
0 f war 0 nly alter
e conc
0 f peace. ,,113 A s we h ave seen, t his
phrase is not applicable to an armistice. The 1929 Geneva Prisoner of War
Convention changed this considerably, providing that an armistice must, in
114
principle, contain stipulations regarding the repatriation of prisoners of war.
It further provided that, iffor some reason, the parties had been unable to include
such a provision in their armistice, they would conclude a separate agreement
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on the subject as soon as possible and repatriate the prisoners of war with the
least possible delay. The 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention went still a
step further, providing that prisoners of war should be "released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation ofactive hostilities," and providing further that,
failing such a provision in the armistice, each Detaining Power must establish
llS
and execute without delay a unilateral plan of repatriation.
In view of the
foregoing, and because of the experience in Korea, The Law of Land Warfare,
unlike Lieber's Instructions and the Rules of Land Warfare, states that "if it is
desired that prisoners of war and civilian internees should be released or
exchanged, specific provisions in this regard should be made.,,116
Prior to the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Conventions in
Geneva in 1949 most writers on the subject took the position that the final
answer to the question of the return of prisoners of war was for the treaty of
1l7
peace, not for the armistice.
They reasoned that to act otherwise would be
to give an unwarranted advantage to the side which had lost the greater number
of soldiers to the enemy and a corresponding disadvantage to the side which had
been successful in capturing the larger number of prisoners of war. It was
suggested that it would be appropriate to reach a separate agreement, after the
armistice had been signed, under which prisoners would be exchanged in equal
numbers and correspondin Edes, thus avoiding any change in the relative
positions ofthe belligerents. 1 This is the procedure normally followed in cartels
for the exchange of prisoners of war. 1l9 While there is much to be said for this
position, it is not fully supported by history and, in the light of the quoted
provisions of the 1949 Geneva Convention, it is not in conformity with the
requirements of an international convention which has been so widely accepted
l20
as already to be considered as constituting universal internationallaw.
This
is not to say that the basic reason for the theory expressed above is not a valid
one. When prisoners of war are held by the two belligerent sides in such
disproportionate numbers as was the case in Korea, there is no question but that
total release and repatriation considerably changes the balance between the two
sides, even where there is a provision, as there is in the Korean Armistice
Agreement, against the employment in subsequent acts of war of prisoners of
. d pursuant to an amusnce
. . agreement. l2f
war reIease d an d repatnate
The Renville Truce Agreement (which, it will be recalled, was signed on
January 17, 1948, prior to the drafting of the 1949 Geneva Convention and
prior even to the Stockholm Conference where the working draft of the
subsequent prisoner of war convention was prepared) contains the following
significant provision:

f

To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to
commence discussions with a view of the most rapid and convenient
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implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the
number of prisoners held by either party.122
The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement provided for an
immediate exchange of all prisoners of war. 123 The provisions of the Korean
Armistice Agreement with regard to prisoners of war are too well known to
124
require repetition here.
Article 21 of the Agreement for the Cessation of
Hostilities in Viet-Nam f:rovided generally for the "liberation and repatriation
of all prisoners of war." 1 5 In elaborating on that provision the agreement states
that prisoners of war will be "surrendered" to the other side-which would
seem to indicate acceptance of the principle of "forcible repatriation." However,
the agreement further provides that the side to which they have been surrendered
will assist them in proceeding to the zone of their choice-which would seem
to indicate a right ofself-determination by the individual. It is extremely doubtful
that any of these unfortunates were among the horde of refugees who moved
126
from the Communist to the non-Communist zone.
The omission of the India-Pakistan Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement
from the above discussion was not inadvertent. For some reason the United
Nations Commission resolution which became the Agreement made no
mention of this subject; and apparently neither of the parties ever suggested that
it be included.

G. Consultative Machinery
Provisions in an armistice agreement for the establishment of commissions
with various functions have a long history. Under the circumstances, it is
somewhat strange to find that the subject had not been mentioned in the
literature on the subject prior to the inclusion of a provision with regard thereto
in The Law of Land Warfare. That provision reads as follows:
Consultative machinery. It is generally desirable to provide for the establishment
of a commission, composed of representatives of the opposing forces, to supervise
the implementation of the armistice agreement. Additional commissions,
composed of representatives of the belligerents or of neutral powers or both, may
be constituted to deal with such matters as the repatriation of prisoners of war. 127

The armistice proposed by the ambassadors of France and Great Britain in
128
1608 has already been mentioned in another connection.
That document
also contained a provision to the effect that in the event the parties were unable
to agree concerning the continued occupation of certain villages and hamlets,
some "notable persons" would be selected to decide the question. This provision
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was among those which the parties omitted from the Truce of Antwerp.
However, the Truce ofRatisbonne established a commission to delimit frontiers
so that in the future there may be no dispute to the prejudice of the truce herein
agree upon. The said Conunissioners shall work together to the end that if either
party fails to make the promised restitutions, or to comply with any provision of
. will b e entlre
. 1y his own act. 129
this agreement, It
Similarly, the 1809 Vienna agreement provided for commissioners to be
named by both sides for the purpose of supervising the execution of the
130
And the Finnish-Russian Armistice of 1940 called for special
agreement.
representatives of the two sides to decide problems arising in the implementation
131
of the agreement.
All of the post-World War II armistice agreements establish commissions of
one type or another for the purpose of either implementing or supervising the
implementation of various provisions of the agreements. Thus, the Renville
Truce Agreement made use of the Committee of Good Offices created by the
United Nations and the Committee's military assistants for the investigation of
132
incidents, supervision of the withdrawal of troops, etc.
The India-Pakistan
133
Agreement availed itself of the services of the United Nations Commission.
The Israeli-Lebanese Agreement created a Mixed Armistice Commission and
also provided for the use of the personnel of the United Nations Truce
..
0 rgamzaaon.
. . 134 The K orean Armi'
sace A greement create d a
SupervlSlon
variety of organs, including a Military Armistice Commission, a Neutral Nations
Supervisory Commission, a Committee for the Repatriation ofPrisoners ofWar,
Joint Red Cross Teams, a Committee for Assisting the Return of Displaced
135
Similarly, the
Civilians, and a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission.
Viet-Nam Agreement created a Joint Commission and an International
.. 136
C omnusslOn.
It is believed that on the basis of the foregoing consistent experience of recent
years it may be assumed that the device of commissions made up of members
of the belligerent forces and commissions made up of representatives of neutral
nations, to which is assigned the mission ofimplementing and of supervising the
implementation of the provisions of an armistice agreement, has become an
accepted feature of such agreements.

H. Political
It has already been pointed out that one of the characteristics of an armistice
. as we11 as mili' tary, causes.
I
137 Th e
. th at 1t
. may contam
. poliac
. al an d econonuc,
1S
Law of Land Warfare enumerates a number of categories of such clauses which
may be contained in an armistice, including disposition of aircraft and shipping;
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co-operation in the punishment of war crimes; restitution of captured or looted
property; shipping, communications facilities and public utilities; civil
administration; displaced persons; and the dissolution of organizations which
138
may subvert public order.
It is obvious that a number of these subjects would
only be appropriate in an armistice such as most of those which were concluded
during or at the end of the two world wars where the victors were dictating
terms to the vanquished. Some, such as those relating to displaced persons,
movement of civilians, commercial intercourse, etc., have already been
discussed. Generally speaking, it may be stated that the scope of this type of
provision is limited only by the ability of the belligerents to reach agreement
with regard thereto. Numerous examples of such provisions may be found in
the armistice agreements of the past decade which we have been examining
. 139
h erem.

I. Violations
The question of denunciations has already been discussed in connection with
140
armistice agreements ofindefinite duration.
Now it is appropriate to examine
the problem of violations of an armistice agreement and denunciations in
connection therewith.
In his Instructions, Lieber stated that "if either party violates any express
condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other.,,141 Article
51 of the Declaration of Brussels also included a statement to the effect that a
violation of an armistice gave the other party the right to terminate it ("Ie
denoncer,,).142 It will be noted that under either of these rules a belligerent had
the right to denounce an armistice for a violation of even a minor condition.
An attempt was made to remedy this situation by Article 40 of both of the Hague
Regulations which authorized a denunciation for a "serious violation," with the
additional proviso that in cases of "urgency" the violation might warrant the
recommencing of hostilities immediately.143 Clearly, the failure to define the
term "serious violation" and the indefiniteness of the term "urgency" left a great
deal to the discretion of the aggrieved party.144 After analyzing the applicable
international conventions and the writers on the subject, one eminent author
arrives at this conclusion:
... Three rules may be formulated from this-(l) violations which are not serious
do not even give a right to denounce an armistice; (2) serious violations empower
the other party to denounce the armistice, but not, as a rule, to recommence
hostilities at once without giving notice; (3) only in case of urgency is a party
145
justified in recommencing hostilities without notice.
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Parties nego1latmg amus1lce agreements have apparendy been loathe to
include any reference therein with regard to the possibility of denunciation for
violation, perhaps because they have preferred to rely on the rather vague rule
of international law. 146 It is suggested that in these days of extremely detailed
agreements it might be well to consider the advisability of specifying in the
agreement which of its provisions are considered by the parties to be of such
importance that a violation would be considered either "serious" or "urgent."
One of the important problems with regard to violations is that ofthe violation
of a provision of an armistice by an individual acting independendy. Grotius
stated that "private acts do not break a truce unless in addition there is a public
147
act, that is, through command or approval.
This is the basic tenor of Article
52 of the Declaration of Brussels and Article 41 of both of the Hague
Regulations, all of which, in substance, provide that a violation by a private act
only entides the aggrieved side to demand that the individual offender be
148
punished and, in an appropriate case, to demand compensation for damages.
The Rules of Land Warfare defined the term "private individuals" as
excluding members of the armed forces. 149 The Law of Land Warfare reverses
that position, stating that in the sense of Article 41 of the 1907 Hague
Regulations a private individual is any person, including a member of the armed
forces, who acts on his own responsibility.150 It is believed that the Hague
Regulation intended, like Grotius, to distinguish between official and unofficial
acts, and that the definition appearing in the later manual is fully consonant with
that distinction: The Law of Land Warfare states further that violations by
individuals do not justify denunciation unless they are proved to have been
committed with the knowledge and consent of their government or
commander-and that consent may be inferred from a persistent failure to punish
151
the offenders.
As far back as the Armistice ofUlm in 1647 we find a provision to the effect
that officers of either side who violated any provision of the armistice agreement
152
would be severely punished.
Paragraph 13e of the Korean Armistice
Agreement requires the commanders of the two sides to "insure that personnel
of their respective commands who violate any of the provisions of this Armistice
Agreement are adequately punished"; and Article 22 of the Viet-Nam
Agreement is identical, except for minor differences which probably resulted
during the course of translating from English to French and then back into
153
English.
It can logically be assumed that if the parties provide for the
punishment ofindividual violators, they do not contemplate that such violations
constitute a basis for denunciation.
The emergence of the guerrilla or partisan as a potent force in modem warfare
has emphasized this problem. Irregular forces are frequendy difficult to control;
but it is not unusual to find them specifically included, with the regular forces,
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154
within the restrictions contained in the annistice.
While this procedure is
obviously appropriate, their frequent disregard of the orders of the commander
of the organized military forces, who is responsible for insuring compliance with
the provisions of the annistice, can become an acute problem insofar as violations
. . are conceme d.155
of th e arnust:J.ce

J. Naval
Authorities wnt:J.ng on the war conventions have, with rare exception,
devoted little more than a sentence or two to the subject of the effect ofa general
~
156 They are, h owever, pract:J.c
. ally unammous
.
.h
. . on naval wanare.
arnust:J.ce
WIt
regard to the few rules which they do enunciate.
Naturally, a general annistice would impliedly include a prohibition against
a naval bombardment or a naval battle, inasmuch as every general annistice
includes a complete suspension of active hostilities. However, the problem is
more difficult when the question involved is the maintenance ofa naval blockade
with its concomitant factors such as the right of visit and search, control over
neutral vessels, seizure of contraband, taking of prizes, etc.
One of the more recent works on this subject states:
... During a general annistice, belligerents probably also have the right to capture
vessels belonging to the enemy and to stop and visit neutral ships as well as to
prevent them from breaking a blockade and from carrying contraband, unless
otherwise agreed upon. The question is not, however, settled and the taking of
. .10 partIc
. u1ar may b e COOSl'dered as a h os tile act. 157
pnze

As a practical matter, it is difficult to see how a belligerent who continues the
maintenance of a blockade during an annistice can avoid committing hostile
acts. However, most writers are far more positive than the above quotation
would indicate concerning the right ofa belligerent to continue during a general
annistice a naval blockade which had been previously established and concerning
which the annistice agreement makes no provision. 158 There is some indication
that modem thinking in this direction is premised on the equally modem
doctrine which pennits a naval blockade even in time of peace-the so-called
"pacific blockade.,,159 The limitation with regard to prizes noted above is
undoubtedly based upon the statement made by one writer to the effect that
such an act "is irreconcilable with a state of suspension of hostilities.,,160 It is
apparent that the failure, in an appropriate case, to include within an armistice
a clear provision with regard to naval blockade, and naval warfare generally, can
be the cause of serious difficulties and, perhaps, even of the resumption of
hostilities. 161 Let us review some of the annistice agreements in which an
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attempt has been made to cover the subject and weigh the sufficiency or
insufficIency of the provisions drafted for that purpose.
The Truce of Antwerp (Spain-United Provinces) stated that "all acts of
hostility of all nature on sea and on land shall cease.,,162 Such a clause would
prohibit a pitched battle at sea or a naval bombardment of an enemy shore-but
would it prohibit a blockade? The Armistice ofParis which followed Napoleon's
abdication in 1814 was more specific. 163 It provided that the blockade of France
would be lifted and that all prizes taken after various dates (which allowed for
the time necessary for the news to reach different areas) would be restored. No
difficulties should arise under such an armistice; nor under the somewhat similar
provisions of the Armistice of Malmoe, which even went so far as to require
the return ofprizes legitimately taken and to provide for indemnification ifprizes
164
and their cargoes could not be returned in kind.
The Armistice of Versailles of1871 (France-Germany) created a naval line
of demarcation and provided for the restoration of all captures made after the
conclusion of the armistice and before its notification. 165 Again, this would seem
to meet the requirements of precision and completeness essential to prevent
disputes.
The Armistice ofShimonoseki Gap an-China) adopted the opposite approach,
specifically authorizing the seizure of any military sea movements. 166 While this
is, of course, entirely ,vithin the power of the parties, some act pursuant thereto
may cause such a public reaction as to practically compel a government to resume
hostilities-and, also, a government which is looking for an excuse to do so can
avail itself of an incident thereunder as a basis for the resumption of hostilities.
Neither the two original armistice agreements entered into on May 19, 1897
(Bpirus), and May 20, 1897 (Thessaly), in the Greco-Turkish War of that period,
nor the amended agreements reached on June 3, contained any provisions
167
relating to the naval situation.
On June 4 a supplementary agreement was
concluded which lifted the Greek blockade, but prohibited Turkey from
reinforcing her armies in Greece or bringing in any munitions, limiting her to
revictualing her troops hvice a week through designated Greek ports. These,
and certain other naval provisions of the supplementary agreement were so
indefinite as to be calculated to encourage disputes-which they did.
It has already been noted that the Protocol of Portsmouth (Russia-Japan)
prohibited bombardment of enemy territory by naval forces and that the
subsequent "Naval Protocol of Armistice" established a boundary line between
the hvo fleets. 168 The Protocol of Portsmouth also provided that "maritime
captures will not be suspended by the armistice." It is to be assumed that the
Japanese were following the precedent which they had established in the
Armistice of Shimonoseki.
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The early post-World War II annistice agreements tended to follow the
irregular pattern indicated above. The Renville Truce Agreement contains no
reference to naval warfare or the sea-a strange situation for an armistice relating
169
The Israeli-Lebanese General Annistice Agreement
to an island area.
provided that "a general annistice between the anned forces of the two
parties-land, sea and air-is hereby established" and that "no element of the
land, sea or air military or para-military forces of either Party ... shall commit
any warlike or hostile acts.,,170 We have already seen how identical provisions
have caused grave disputes between Israel and Egypt with regard to their effect
on Egypt's naval blockade. 171
In the Korean Annistice Agreement the required precision and completeness
on this subject were almost reached. Paragraph 12 of that Agreement called for
a complete cessation of all hostilities, including naval hostilities; and paragraph
15 provides:
This Armistice Agreement shall apply to all opposing naval forces, which naval
forces shall respect the waters contiguous to the Demilitarized Zone and to the
land area of Korea under the military control of the opposing side, and shall not
engage in blockade of any kind of Korea. 172
This is probably one of the most complete naval provisions ever included in an
annistice agreement. However, the general descriptive statement concerning
this annistice is qualified in view of the fact that in negotiating it an attempt to
reach an agreement on the extent of the territorial waters was unsuccessful
because the United Nations Command proposed the traditional three-mile limit,
the Communists insisted on the twelve-mile limit, and the Republic of Korea
had established the arbitrary "Rhee Line" which extends anywhere from 60 to
200 miles from shore. According to unofficial accounts the United Nations
Command has voluntarily imposed a twelve-mile limit on its personnel in order
to avoid incidents. However, this has not been entirely successful.
Finally, the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam is almost,
though not quite, as complete as the Korean Annistice Agreement. Article 24
provides that the agreement applies to all of the anned forces of either party and
states that such anned forces "shall commit no act and undertake no operation
against the other party and shall not engage in blockade of any kind in
Viet_Nam.,,173 It also defines the territory of a party as including "territorial
waters." France supports the three-mile definition of territorial waters and it is
to be assumed that the state ofViet-Nam does likewise. It is equally to be assumed
that the Viet-Minh will subscribe to the twelve-mile limit of territorial waters
supported by the U.S.S.R. Accordingly, here, too, there is a possibility of
dispute.
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The foregoing discussion has, it is believed, indicated the necessity of
including in an annistice agreement specific and precise provisions with regard
to naval warfare, blockades, etc. It should also have indicated that progress in
the right direction has been made in recent years and that care on the part of
the negotiators of future annistice agreements can quickly and simply eliminate
the naval problem as a source of irritation during the often uneasy period of
armistice.
IV. Conclusion

The general annistice is a living, dynamic war convention which, despite
centuries of use, is still continuing in each decade to expand its scope and to
increase the importance of its position among the agreements concerning the
non-hostile relations of belligerents. The elaborate annistice agreements of
recent years have, in effect, rendered the preliminaries of peace obsolete. It is
not inconceivable that the formal treaty of peace will suffer the same fate and
that wars \vill one day end at the annistice table.
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